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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1831, John Austin, professor of law at the University of London,
published An Outline of a Course of Lectures on General Jurisprudence, or the Philosophy of
Positive Law. The outline—like his Province of Jurisprudence Determined, published the
following year—presents Austin’s now famous thesis that law, properly so called,
is positive law.1 The proper province of law, Austin argued, is that of commands
by a sovereign power that are backed by the threat of sanction. While some
positivists quibble with Austin’s definition, they accept his basic orientation: “The
existence of a law is one thing,” Austin writes, “its merits or demerits are another
thing.”2 From Austin to H.L.A. Hart,3 legal positivism is the thesis that law is a
social fact, something fully separate from morality.4 This is, today, well known.

* Associate Professor of Political Studies and Human Rights; Academic Director, Hannah Arendt
Center for Politics and the Humanities, Bard College. I would like to thank Douglas Moggach who
commented on the original version of this paper at the Cambridge Seminar in Political Theory and
Intellectual History. I also thank the editors of the UC Irvine Law Review for their excellent assistance.
1. Both texts are published in JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE
DETERMINED (The Legal Classics Library 1984) (1832).
2. Id. at 278. The fifth edition of Austin’s work, reprinted as part of the Cambridge Texts in the
History of Political Thought series, transposes the quotation from Lecture VI to the end of Lecture V. See
JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 157 (Wilfrid E. Rumble ed.,
1995).
3. H.L.A. Hart, Austin’s greatest disciple and critic, repeats Austin’s same formula in his
CONCEPT OF LAW 203 (1961).
4. MARIANNE CONSTABLE, JUST SILENCES 32 (2005). See also Jules Coleman, Incorporationism,
Conventionality, and the Practical Difference Thesis, in HART’S POSTSCRIPT 99, 114–16 (Jules Coleman ed.,
2001).
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Less well known—indeed, I cannot find one single reference to it in the
academic literature of the past hundred years—is the fact that on the title page of
Austin’s Outline is a single epigraph by the German philosopher, scientist, and
jurist Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Austin’s epigraph is taken from a 1711 letter
Leibniz wrote to Heinrich Ernst Kestner, a German jurist. The epigraph reflects
Leibniz’s continuing interest in legal reform that began with his youthful work, A
New Method for Learning and Teaching Jurisprudence, which the twenty-one-year-old
Leibniz composed in a carriage en route to Mainz. The treatise was part of his
application to become the assistant minister of law at the court of the Bishop
Elector of Mainz, Kurfürst Johann Philipp von Schönborn. The epigraph reads:
As long as the powerful let those educated in legal decision making—
those who are prudent and well motivated—put their heads together in
private consultation and let them think about establishing law such that
they render decisions with more certainty than currently—this work
could make a mockery of the authority of princes.5
The Leibnizian epigraph to Austin’s text is surprising. The epigraph is surprising
first because Austin mocks the authority of princes even though he famously
argues that law is a product of the prince’s will. It is also surprising because
Leibniz is rightly thought to be one of the great thinkers of the natural law
tradition. What is an epigraph from the greatest natural lawyer of the seventeenth
century doing on the title page of the work that has established itself as the locus
classicus of nineteenth-century legal positivism? What, in other words, is the
connection between Leibniz’s natural law thinking and legal positivism?
The epigraph recalls Leibniz’s lifelong ambition to write and implement a
legal code that would “reestablish morality, the basis of right, and equity with a
little bit more clarity and certitude than they are accustomed to having.”6 At the
core of Leibniz’s jurisprudential efforts was what he called the “elements of law,”
modeled upon Euclid’s axioms and theorems. If jurisprudence and metaphysics
have relied too much on insight and have lacked clarity, Leibniz writes, the remedy
is the extension of the use of elemental principles: “One of the chief ways of
making jurisprudence more manageable, and of surveying its vast ocean, as though
in a geographical chart, is by tracing a large number of particular decisions back to
more general principles . . . .”7 Just as in arithmetic large and complex numbers

5. Leibniz’s very difficult Latin reads: “Dum potentes aliud agunt, jurisconsulti eruditi,
prudentes, bene animati, conferant capita privatim, cogitentque de jure constituendo, ut reddant
certius quam nunc: posset is labor praeludere principum auctoritati.” AUSTIN, supra note 1, at A. For
the source of Austin’s epigraph, see 3 GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNIZ, EPISTOLAE AD DIVERSOS
254 (Christian Kortholt ed., Leipzig, Sumtu Bern. Christoph. Breitkopfii 1738). I thank my colleague
Benjamin Stevens for assistance with the translation.
6. In GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNIZ, OEUVRES CHOISIES 33 (Lucy Prenant ed., 1942), cited
in HANS-PETER SCHNEIDER, JUSTITIA UNIVERSALIS 52 n.113 (1967) (my translation).
7. G.W. LEIBNIZ, NEW ESSAYS ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 425 (Peter Remnant &
Jonathan Bennett eds. & trans., 1996).
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can be broken down into their component parts, and just as geometrical theorems
can be traced back to their most fundamental axioms, so can the diffuse truths of
juridical insight be set upon a foundation of first principles and maxims. It is
precisely this task that Leibniz envisions for himself.
Austin too sought a clear “science of jurisprudence.” As W.L. Morison has
argued, Austin set himself an ambitious goal of creating a “map of a legal system”
in which particular laws and decisions would be traceable back to the most general
elements of law.8 These elements, what Austin calls “miniscule elements,” are
Austin’s response to Bentham’s effort to organize his codification of law around
single commands that Bentham, following Leibniz, names “monads.”9
Importantly, Austin’s codified map of the miniscule elements of law is the
province of jurists, not of kings or legislators. It is the work of legal scientists—
not political sovereigns—to organize the laws according to rational principles of
utility. This means that even though Austin defined law as “the command of a
sovereign, the sovereign does not figure in [his] account of the law except
incidentally.”10 What Austin embraced in Leibniz’s jurisprudential project was the
ambitious dream to create a scientific code of law that would elevate scientifically
trained judges above princes as the true creators of a rational legislation.
The bond between Leibniz and Austin is their mutual commitment to enlist
science to respond to a similar phenomenon—the loss of law’s natural, rational,
and traditional authority and the rise of positive law. What shocks Leibniz in the
seventeenth century and is obvious to Austin in the nineteenth century is that
human laws have come to have no necessary connection with morality, reason, or
justice. Living through what Friedrich Nietzsche later called “the death of God,”
both the natural lawyer Leibniz and the positive lawyer Austin confronted head on
the fact that laws had lost the patina of divine rationality that had for centuries
secured their authority. Law, stripped of its natural authority as a ratio scripta,
confronted its subjects as mere will, the decision of one with the power to enforce
it.
Austin accepted and even celebrated this transformation of law into positive
law, as did Hobbes, Bentham, and other early proponents of positive law. Law,
the positivists argued, is first and most importantly a means of keeping order.
While it is to be wished that positive laws reflect a moral, ethical, or useful ideal of
a just society, the lack of agreement on the content of moral, ethical, and utilitarian
ideals means that a reliance on natural laws threatens to devolve into disorder and
chaos. In the name of order, the science of positive law must sacrifice justice for
clarity.
Unlike Austin, Leibniz saw positive law’s elevation of order over justice as a

8. See W.L. MORISON, JOHN AUSTIN 107–19 (1982).
9. Id. at 115.
10. Id. at 114.
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grave danger that could only be neutralized by transforming law into a science.
Writing in an age in which the divine, rational, and customary insights that
grounded the traditional authority of law had lost their power, Leibniz turned to
science as the specifically modern way to justify law and thus repair the frayed
connection between law and justice. Science, Leibniz believed, speaks with the
authority of objective truth that could reinvigorate law and resuscitate law’s lost
claim to justified authority.
Leibniz’s turn to science to authorize and justify positive law has been
ignored by legal and political scholars. This is strange given the overriding
prevalence of science in law today. Beyond Austin’s own invocation of Leibniz’s
scientific project, the entire history of law over the last three centuries can be told
as a history of the various sciences of law. From Austin’s science of utility to
Hart’s sociological jurisprudence, from law and society to law and economics, and
from legal realism to analytic jurisprudence, modern lawyers have sought to
validate, critique, and justify law by recourse to the social sciences. The science of
law is, it seems, a corollary of the rise of positive law.
I want to suggest that the connection between science and positive law is so
deep that science, by providing otherwise arbitrary positive laws with objective
claims to justice, is a necessary element of all positive law. For positivist jurists,
therefore, law cannot simply be understood as the bare will of a sovereign—as
Austin holds—or even as a body of legitimate rules that are obeyed in fact—as
modern positivists like H.L.A. Hart insist. The omnipotent will of the sovereign as
well as the law’s claim to legitimacy are both—in ways overlooked by positivist
legal scholars—compelled to deck themselves with the legitimating mantle of
scientific justification. It is a mistake to think that positive laws are willful
commands divorced from reasons and justifications. Rather, positive laws are
precisely those laws most in need of reasons. In other words, positive laws are
those laws that must be justified. Since positivist lawyers deny that laws can be
justified by transcendent principles, they seek law’s reason and justification in the
only source of objective norms accepted today: science.
To argue that positive law is most essentially a product of scientific
justification flies in the face of the overwhelming conviction that positive law is
rooted in will. Since H.L.A. Hart chose to begin his inquiry into positive law with
Austin, legal scholars have traced the roots of positive law back to Thomas
Hobbes’s voluntarism. Austin himself cites Hobbes’s claims that “no law can be
unjust” as precedent for his own view that “no positive law is legally unjust.”11
And as does Austin, Hobbes understands law as a command: “Law in general, is
not counsel, but command; nor a command of any man to any man; but only of
him, whose command is addressed to one formally obliged to obey him.”12

11.
12.

AUSTIN, supra note 2, at 217 n.20.
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 175 (J.C.A. Gaskin ed., 1996).

Assembled_Issue_3 v5 (Do Not Delete)

2011]

2/22/2012 9:07 AM

FROM JUSTICE TO JUSTIFICATION

615

Hobbes, as Leo Strauss argued, sets law under the willful assertion of right and
defends the primacy of a sovereign “right” over natural law.13 As a result of his
subjection of law to will, Hobbes’s voluntarism and his separation of law from
morality have come to be seen as the unchallenged foundation of positive law.
Against this consensus view, I offer an alternative genealogy of positive law.
Rather than Hobbesian will or Austinian command, I argue that the need for
scientific justification is the essential impulse of positive law. In doing so, I suggest
that the intellectual history of positive law is to be found, not in the tradition of
legal voluntarism that runs from Hobbes through Austin to Hart, but, instead, in
the rise of legal science that begins with Leibniz and has its great flourishing in
nineteenth-century Germany. Part II of this paper locates the birth of legal science
in Leibniz’s seventeenth-century scientific metaphysics. Parts III and IV trace the
development of Leibniz’s scientific approach to law through the work of Friedrich
Carl von Savigny and Rudolf von Jhering, two of the leading members of the
school of legal science in Germany. Finally, by situating the rise of positive law in
the impulse to transform law into a product of science, I show how positive law
seeks its justification through science even as it abandons the quest for justice
itself.
II. LEIBNIZ
Wilhelm Gottfried Leibniz was the first jurist to think about law as a product
of modern science. That Leibniz would turn to science to justify law’s authority
should not be surprising. Leibniz lived during the well-publicized social crises of
the seventeenth century, which included a spiritual crisis of authority that touched
politics and law every bit as much as population and religion.14 Shorn of the veils
of “faith, childish prepossession, and deception” by which man had been
“conscious of himself only as a member of a race, people, party, corporation,
family or otherwise in some form of universality,” the pillars of traditional legal
and political authority were shaken.15 As a leading figure within a generation that
believed that the crisis of authority was to be overcome through enlightened
reason and a “renewal of science,”16 Leibniz saw his project to discover a science
of natural law as a means to facilitate the knowing of law and thus to advance an
ethical politics that would “raise up the common good” and further the public
13. LEO STRAUSS, THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF HOBBES, at viii (Elsa M. Sinclair trans.,
Univ. of Chi. Press 1952) (1936).
14. See generally PAUL HAZARD, THE EUROPEAN MIND 1680–1715 (J. Lewis May trans.,
Meridian Books 1963) (1935).
15. JACOB BURCKHARDT, DIE KULTUR DER RENAISSANCE IN ITALIEN 88 (Horst Günther
ed., 1989). In English, JACOB BURCKHARDT, THE CIVILIZATION OF THE RENAISSANCE IN ITALY 98
(S.G.C. Middlemore trans., 1990).
16. 3 KONRAD MOLL, DER JUNGE LEIBNIZ: EINE WISSENSCHAFT FÜR EIN AUFGEKLÄRTES
EUROPA: DER WELTMECHANISMUS DYNAMISCHER MONADENPUNKTE ALS GEGENENTWURF ZU
DEN LEHREN VON DESCARTES UND HOBBES 32–33 (1996).
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happiness.
The one legal scholar to perceive a connection between Leibniz and the rise
of positive law is M.H. Hoeflich. In his essay, “Law & Geometry: Legal Science
from Leibniz to Langdell,” Hoeflich argues that Leibniz is the undisputed founder
of a modern geometric paradigm for law.17 However, what Leibniz and the other
natural scientists of the seventeenth century saw in science was not simply a
geometric paradigm for logical analysis. Rather, it was an extension of the
geometric method from logical certainty to the scientific method of knowing
actual beings in the world. While the certainty offered by the geometric paradigm
is an important element of Leibniz’s thinking, it is the natural scientific conception
of law as a knowable and rational system—not geometry—that is the foundation
of Leibniz’s philosophic jurisprudence.18
At the root of Leibniz’s scientific reconceptualization of law is his attempted
solution to one of the oldest and greatest philosophical questions: what is a thing?
Descartes had famously offered a dualistic thesis that held all things to be
comprised of both body and mind. Descartes defined body as absolute
extension—that is, absolute physical being—and mind as absolute reason, but he
had struggled unsuccessfully to explain how the body can influence the mind and
vice versa. The Cartesian thing could only move and act in the world through the
intervention of a deus ex machina, by which God causes thoughts and bodily
actions to arise simultaneously.
Against Descartes’s radical separation of mind and body, Leibniz argues that
either Descartes’s purely mechanical or geometric world has no beginning, which
Leibniz believes is absurd, or there must be some nonphysical cause inherent
within each and every being. In other words, Leibniz sees in a way that Descartes
had not that the scientific method must presuppose a necessarily metaphysical
conception of substance. In every being there is, Leibniz argues, a nonphysical and
thus unextended and purely rational form that “is.” The Cartesian dualism
separating mind and being is, Leibniz insists, impossible.
Leibniz’s proof for the existence of “unextended beings”—what he comes to
call monads—proceeds from logic. Every being, he reasons, must come to be and
also pass away; every thing has a beginning and an end. Plot the beginning and
end of a being on a line ab whose middle point is c. What is the beginning of the
line?
a...e ... d ... c............b

17. M.H. Hoeflich, Law & Geometry: Legal Science from Leibniz to Langdell, 30 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
95, 99 (1986).
18. Nicholas Rescher, Leibniz and the Concept of a System, 13 STUDIA LEIBNITIANA 114, 122
(1981).
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The segment ac cannot be the beginning, because cd can be taken from it; nor
is ad the beginning, because ed can be taken away, and so on. No matter how small
the point of beginning is made to be, there is no beginning of the line from which
a smaller part could not be removed. A true beginning, Leibniz concludes, must
be something from which nothing temporal, spatial, or causal can be removed.
However, that from which nothing extended can be removed is unextended.
Therefore, he concludes, “the beginning of body, space, motion, or time—namely,
a point, conatus, or instant—is either nothing, which is absurd, or unextended,
which was to be demonstrated.”19 The beginning of every thing, in other words, is
a nonmaterial and thus formal part of the thing—what he calls a monad.
In this elegant and early proof, Leibniz expresses an idea that remained at the
heart of his thinking throughout his life, a thought that has extraordinary
importance not only in mechanics but also in metaphysics and jurisprudence. If
motion and change are possible, the beginning of motion and change cannot be
found among the aggregate of extended substances. What holds for motion and
change also holds for all things in the world and even for the world itself, because
“a sufficient reason for existence cannot be found merely in any one individual
thing or even in the whole aggregate and series of things.”20 In all contingent or
changing things, there must be reasons for the existence of the objects outside of
the series of objective things themselves. Every thing, insofar as it is, must have a
formal—that is, nonphysical—reason from which it proceeds. Within a substance,
there must be a nonphysical force, “something related to souls, which is
commonly called a substantial form . . . .”21 The formal reason, or monad, for a
thing is not the mere cause of the thing. Rather, it is the forceful source of all
action. Every thing has an active force from which it is driven to act out of itself.
The introduction of force is central to an understanding of “the true concept
of substance,” or being, as well as to Leibniz’s jurisprudence.22 The science of law
must investigate not merely the existing law in a society, but also the principles of
law, “or what is the same thing,” the “first reasons of justice.”23 All law that is and
that may be has a reason and ground in the principles of natural justice. Law arises
not simply from geometric elements but from the rational and substantial forms—
that is, forces—that are the metaphysical fundament of all beings. The effort to
know law is the scientific inquiry into the formal forces of justice: “Jurisprudence

19. GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNIZ, Studies in Physics and the Nature of Body, in PHILOSOPHICAL
PAPERS AND LETTERS 139, 140 (Leroy E. Loemker ed. & trans., Kluwer Academic Publishers 2d ed.
1989) (1956).
20. GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNIZ, On the Radical Origination of Things, in PHILOSOPHICAL
PAPERS AND LETTERS, supra note 19, at 486, 486.
21. GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNIZ, Discourse on Metaphysics, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS AND
LETTERS, supra note 19, at 303, 309.
22. GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNIZ, On the Correction of Metaphysics and the Concept of Substance, in
PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS AND LETTERS, supra note 19, at 432, 433.
23. 2 G.W. LEIBNIZ, De Jure Et Iustitia, in TEXTES INÉDITS 618, 618 (Gaston Grua ed., 1948).
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is, then, the science of what is just,” and takes as its object the “force [vis] of
justice.”24
As a forceful substance, law too must be governed by the first principle of
science: nothing is without a reason. By the principle of sufficient reason, all law
must have a reason for why it is rather than for why it is not. Specifically, Leibniz
argues that all law can be derived from a single principle of justice: caritas sapientis,
or “the charity of the wise.”25 Charity, he writes, is understood as “benevolentia
universalis,” or a universal well-willing.26 Justice is a charity or love that is above
all the love of God, or rightly determined by God’s eminently wise will. The
wisdom of God—not an abstract proposition but the judicious wisdom of an allknowing, loving, and virtuous being—is the source of justice, and it is this wisdom
that Leibniz believes can be scientifically comprehended through a scientia felicitatis,
a science of happiness.27 Because he understands the highest principle of justice to
be a scientifically knowable principle of God’s will, caritas sapientis, Leibniz is the
first jurist to set the question of law within the province of scientific will. Law, in
other words, is transformed into something knowable, measurable, and calculable
as the charity of God.
Leibniz’s introduction of the principle of sufficient reason into jurisprudence
promised to give law the scientific grounds for its authority that it so dearly
desired. The gift of scientific justification, however, brought with it unintended
consequences. The principle of sufficient reason is a metaphysical thesis
concerning things and how they exist. The principle says that nothing is without a
reason. Stated affirmatively, it says that every thing that is has a reason. In one of
his most important formulations of the principle of reason, Leibniz names it the
“principle of giving back reasons” (“principium reddendae rationis”).28 Since
nothing exists without a reason, nothing exists unless reasons are given for it. All
things, therefore, only exist insofar as they have a reason. Similarly, law too must
have a reason posited for it if it is to exist. Law, in other words, does not exist in
and of itself as a natural or traditional insight into what is right and fitting. A
custom may develop or a statute may be announced, but the custom and the
statute are only valid law insofar as they are justified by reasons.
The result of Leibniz’s scientific understanding of law is that law is

24.
25.

Id.
GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNIZ, Codex Iuris Gentium (Praefatio), in THE POLITICAL
WRITINGS OF LEIBNIZ 165, 170–76 (Patrick Riley ed. & trans., 1972).
26. 3 GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNIZ, DIE PHILOSOPHISCHEN SCHRIFTEN 387 (C.I.
Gerhardt ed., Berlin, Weidmannsche Buchhandlung 1887).
27. “Quia autem sapientia caritatem dirigere debet, hujus quoque definitione opus erit.
Arbitror autem notioni hominum optime satisfieri, si sapientiam nihil aliud esse dicamus quam ipsam
scientiam felicitatis.” Id.
28. 7 GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNIZ, DIE PHILOSOPHISCHEN SCHRIFTEN 309 (C.I.
Gerhardt ed., Berlin, Weidmannsche Buchhandlung 1890). See MARTIN HEIDEGGER, DER SATZ
VOM GRUND 44 (1957).
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subordinated to its reasons and justifications and that law emerges from a first
principle, what Leibniz alternatively calls “justice,” “happiness,” and “wellwilling.” Law is transformed by Leibniz from an authoritative statement of a
practice into a forceful product of the scientific knowing of justice; law, in other
words, must be knowable, not as the pure reason of natural law, nor as the pure
will of positive law, but as a hybrid form of rational or divine will. It is this
scientifically decipherable rationality of law as will that, in the course of the
following centuries, proved to be the seed from which positive law would sprout.
III. SAVIGNY
today,29

Largely forgotten
Leibniz’s legal science had a profound impact on
the development of modern law and, more specifically, on the rise of positive law.
While Leibniz’s influence reaches to contemporary American law, the path of
transmission from Leibniz to Anglo-American common law is more complicated
than Austin’s epigraph might suggest. As much as Austin may have been intrigued
by Leibniz’s jurisprudence, the true flourishing of Leibnizian legal science is in the
work of Friedrich Carl von Savigny, the great founder of the German school of
legal science.
In 1790, Gustav Hugo—Savigny’s forerunner as the founder of the German
school of historical legal science—published the first volume of a new legal
journal, Civilistisches Magazin; the first article, written by Hugo himself, was titled
simply “Leibniz.” In 1877, Rudolf von Jhering—Savigny’s greatest student—
published his magnum opus, Law as a Means to an End; Jhering’s first sentence
names Leibniz as his precursor and announces that his book is guided by Leibniz’s
principle of sufficient reason. Between Hugo and Jhering stands Friedrich Carl
von Savigny.

29. Philosophical commentaries on Leibniz routinely ignore the existence—let alone the
importance—of his legal writing. While a few recent books address Leibniz’s legal works—most
notably Patrick Riley’s Leibniz’ Universal Jurisprudence, the only substantial English-language account
relating Leibniz’s legal thought to his philosophy—these books are largely focused on the meaning of
justice in Leibniz’s metaphysics while they ignore Leibniz’s jurisprudential ambitions. Riley dedicates
only one three-page section of his book to “Leibniz’ Codification of Caritas Sapientis in His Late
Writings.” PATRICK RILEY, LEIBNIZ’ UNIVERSAL JURISPRUDENCE 182–85 (1996); see SCHNEIDER,
supra note 6; Peter König, Das System des Rechts und die Lehre von den Fiktionen bei Leibniz, in
ENTWICKLUNG DER METHODENLEHRE IN RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT UND PHILOSOPHIE VOM 16. BIS
ZUM 18. JAHRHUNDERT 137 (Jan Schröder ed., 1998); Klaus Luig, Die Privatrechtsordnung im Rechtssystem
von Leibniz, in GRUND- UND FREIHEITSRECHTE VON DER STÄNDISCHEN ZUR SPÄTBÜRGERLICHEN
GESELLSCHAFT 347 (Günter Birtsch ed., 1987); Klaus Luig, Die Rolle des deutschen Rechts in Leibniz’
Kodifikationsplänen, IUS COMMUNE, no. 5, 1975 at 56; Klaus Luig, Leibniz als Dogmatiker des Privatrechts,
in RÖMISCHES RECHT IN DER EUROPÄISCHEN TRADITION 213 (Okko Behrends, Malte Diesselhorst
& Wulf Eckart Voss eds., 1985); Klaus Luig, Die Wurzeln des aufgeklärten Naturrechts bei Leibniz, in
NATURRECHT – SPÄTAUFKLÄRUNG – REVOLUTION 61 (Otto Dann & Diethelm Klippel eds., 1995);
Klaus Luig, Leibniz und die Prinzipien des Vertragsrechts, in GESELLSCHAFTLICHE FREIHEIT UND
VERTRAGLICHE BINDUNG IN RECHTSGESCHICHTE UND PHILOSOPHIE 75 (Jean-François Kervégan
& Heinz Mohnhaupt eds., 1999).
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If Savigny himself does not engage Leibniz directly, he remains Leibniz’s
truest disciple. Like Leibniz, Savigny imagines himself a savior of law. Whereas
Leibniz responds to the voluntarism of Hobbes that threatened to turn law into
mere will, Savigny rises against the danger of positivist legal codification. Both
Leibniz and Savigny also reject a return to naïve natural law ideas that imagine a
common sense or a shared insight into the essence of rightful action. And most
importantly, Savigny shares with Leibniz the belief that the only way to reenliven
law is through science. The very raison d’être behind Savigny’s call for a legal science
is his recognition—shared with Leibniz—of the loss of the traditional idea of
law’s natural authority, an authority that was immediately recognized and accepted.
As deeply as Savigny might embrace Leibniz’s project to save law with
science, he rejects Leibniz’s faith in a purely rational science of law. In place of
Leibniz’s scientific inquiry into a rational and divine will, Savigny calls for an
historically oriented legal science that aims to make manifest “the common
conviction of the Volk”30 (i.e., the common conviction of the people). In doing
so, however, Savigny introduces a radical shift in the relation between law and
science. Against the belief of legal positivists that “all law comes to be from out of
posited law,”31 Savigny argues that law has its origin not in the will of a legislator,
but in the Volksgeist—the spirit of a people or a nation.
The idea that law originates in the Volksgeist names the core thought of
Savigny’s jurisprudence: the source of law is located in the historical spirit of a
nation and not in the rationally deduced laws posited by a legislator. Whereas the
concept of the state includes citizens united by abstractions like a social contract,
the German word Volk—much like the English word “folk,” which shares the
same root—identifies a group of men and women bound together as a people; the
Volk is united by its inner relatedness, its spirit, and its common consciousness.32
The argument that all positive law originates in the Volksgeist 33 means that
law is not something that can be made or posited by human command. Law,
Savigny argues, is not a product of reason or empirical research that can be
discovered and set down in a code. It is not even a thing that is, but a living and
changing consciousness that is forever in the state of becoming. Law, therefore,
can be said, in an important sense, not to exist.
That law has no independent material existence is in fact what Savigny argues
when he writes that “law has no existence in itself, but rather its essence is the life
of man itself, seen from one particular side.”34 This is a claim about the nature of

30. Friedrich Carl von Savigny, Vom Beruf unsrer Zeit für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft, in
POLITIK UND NEUERE LEGISLATIONEN 219 [8] (Hidetake Akamatsu & Joachim Rückert eds., 2000).
31. Id. at 215, 218 [6].
32. See Christoph Mährlein, VOLKSGEIST UND RECHT 20 (2000).
33. “[U]rsprünglich alles positive Recht Volksrecht ist . . . .” 1 FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY,
SYSTEM DES HEUTIGEN RÖMISCHEN RECHTS 50 (Berlin, Veit und Comp. 1840).
34. “Das Recht nämlich hat kein Daseyn für sich, sein Wesen vielmehr ist das Leben der
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law. Instead of existing in itself, “law has its existence in the common Volksgeist,
thus in the general will [Gesammtwillen] that is, to that extent . . . also the will of
each individual.”35 Law, in other words, is indistinguishable from the legal
consciousness of a people.
Since law does not exist separate from life, the task of Savigny’s legal
scientist must be to scientifically discover the essential life and spirit of a people.
Just as every triangle has definite principles from which all its other characteristics
necessarily follow, “so in a similar way does every part of our law have such parts
through which the rest is given: we can name these the guiding principles [of
law].”36 To discover these principles, “to feel them out,” as Savigny revealingly
puts it, “belongs to the most difficult task of our science; more, it is what gives
our work its scientific character.” Through the difficult but essential work of legal
science it becomes possible “to discover the inner unity and the manner of
relating of all juridical concepts and propositions.”37
“History” is the name that Savigny gives to his approach to his sociolegal
science. The word “history,” however, has led to a myriad of misunderstandings.
Savigny does not mean by legal history the chronologically based study of past
laws. The science of history is no mere collection of examples, but is, instead, “the
only way to true knowledge of our own condition.”38 The rigorous historical
method, Savigny argues,
does not consist, as a few recent opponents have unfathomably
maintained, in the exclusive valuation of Roman law: also not in
demanding the unconditional preservation of the given [legal] material
. . . . Its effort is rather to analyze the given material down to its roots so
as to discover its organic principle, by which what is still living will
automatically separate itself from what is dead and belongs only to
history.39
Since our condition is a part of history, the historical study of law requires a broad
Menschen selbst, von einer besondern Seite angesehen.” Savigny, supra note 30, at 230 [30].
35. SAVIGNY, supra note 33, at 24.
36. Savigny, supra note 30, at 226 [22].
37. “Diese heraus zu fühlen, und von ihnen ausgehend den innern Zusammenhang und die
Art der Verwandtschaft aller juristischen Begriffe und Sätze zu erkennen, gehört eben zu den
schwersten Aufgaben unsrer Wissenschaft, ja es ist eigentlich dasjenige, was unsrer Arbeit den
wissenschaftlichen Charakter giebt.” Id.
38. 1 Friedrich Carl von Savigny, Ueber den Zweck der Zeitschrift für geschichtliche Rechtswissenschaft, in
VERMISCHTE SCHRIFTEN 105, 111 (Berlin, Viet und Comp. 1850).
39. Der Charakter derselben [die Strenge historische Methode der Rechtswissenschaft]
besteht nicht, wie einige neuere Gegner unbegreiflicherweise gesagt haben, in ausschließender
Anpreisung des Römischen Rechts: auch nicht darin, daß sie die unbedingte Beybehaltung
irgend eines gegebenen Stoffs verlangte, was sie vielmehr gerade verhüten will, wie sich dieses
oben bey der Beurtheilung des Oesterreichischen Gesetzbuchs gezeigt hat. Ihr Bestreben geht
vielmehr dahin, jeden gegebenen Stoff bis zu seiner Wurzel zu verfolgen, und so sein
organisches Prinzip zu entdecken, wodurch sich von selbst das, was noch Leben hat, von
demjenigen absondern muß, was schon abgestorben ist, und nur noch der Geschichte angehört.
Savigny, supra note 30, at 276 [117–18].
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social-scientific inquiry into the sociological, economic, historical, and
psychological truth of a people. Savigny can rightly be said, therefore, to be the
founder of sociolegal studies and the modern interest in law and society.
How, one might ask, can a sociolegal scientist hope to win knowledge of
such an elusive legal object as the truth of a people? If law is invisible,
undiscoverable through conventional means, and diffused through the entire
historical existence of a nation, how can it possibly be the knowable object of a
legal science?
Savigny’s answer is that law can only be known through insight. It is only
through “insight into the sources” of law that the unified essence of law can be
known in its historical development. 40 As he writes:
The form, however, in which law lives in the common consciousness of
the Volk is not that of the abstract rule, but the living insight into the legal
institute in its organic unity, so that where the need arises to come to
know the rule in its logical form, that form must first be formed through
an artificial process from out of that total insight.41
The form in which scientific knowledge of law comes to be known is insight
(Anschauung). The knowledge of law through science must aim not at a
philosophical understanding of universal and rational legal principles, but rather at
insight into the historically grounded legal principles active in the national
consciousness.42 Savigny’s legal history seeks to find “the living unity that binds
the present to the past.”43 Law, for Savigny, is seen in the scientifically generated
insightful vision into the formal historical core of a nation.
The importance of insight for the scientific knowing of law helps explain one
of the paradoxes of Savigny’s historical approach to law—namely, the minor role
that actual historical facts play in Savigny’s legal science. In spite of Savigny’s
name for his historical legal science, the central role he assigns to the insightful
understanding of legal science leads to the conclusion that legal science depends
more on insight than historical research. Legal science, in other words, is not a
way of knowing an historically existing Volksgeist. Instead, legal science comes to
be a second and complementary source of the existing law itself. Law, as a result,
increasingly comes to be a product of science.
40. 5 Friedrich Carl von Savigny, Recension. N. Th. v. Gönner, über Gesetzgebung und
Rechtswissenschaft in unserer Zeit, in VERMISCHTE SCHRIFTEN 115, 140 (Berlin, Viet und Comp. 1850).
41. Die Gestalt aber, in welcher das Recht in dem gemeinsamen Bewußtseyn des Volks
lebt, ist nicht die der abstracten Regel, sondern die lebendige Anschauung der
Rechtsinstitute in ihrem organischen Zusammenhang, so daß, wo das Bedürfniß entsteht,
sich der Regel in ihrer logischen Form bewußt zu werden, diese erst durch einen
künstlichen Prozeß aus jener Totalanschauung gebildet werden muß.
SAVIGNY supra note 33, at 16 (emphasis added).
42. “Die besonnene Thätigkeit jedes Zeitalters aber müsse darauf gerichtet werden, diesen mit
innerer Notwendigkeit gegebenen Stoff zu durchschauen, zu verjüngen und frisch zu erhalten.”
Savigny, supra note 38, at 113.
43. SAVIGNY, supra note 33, at xv.
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Savigny’s legal science does not just reflect the law living in the Volksrecht—
the law of the Volk, or the law as it exists among people—but gradually comes to
replace it. This legal science conceives in concepts and formulas the law unified in
the Volksgeist; these easily knowable and applicable concepts and formulas herald
the rise of conceptual jurisprudence (Begriffsjurisprudenz) that eventually comes to
supersede the original material content of the Volksgeist. As Savigny writes:
A new organic life originates through the scientific formalization of the
given stuff, a form that strives to uncover and complete its innermost
unity, and which itself constructively works back upon the matter, so that
a new way of creating laws emerges irresistibly from out of science as
such.44
The scientific creation of law is both an organ of the Volksgeist and a new,
organic, and living form of the law itself—one with its own course of
development and evolution. Science, therefore, joins the Volksgeist as one of the
two original sources of law. Thus, the scientific activity of the jurist has a
transformative effect on the law.
Against the reigning vision of the age that subordinates law to posited laws,
Savigny counters that law is originally found in the Volksgeist and later transformed
into scientific law: “[T]his special way of producing law [that emerges in advanced
societies],” Savigny writes, “[is what] I call scientific law.”45
Savigny calls the “scientific life of law” law’s “technical element.” In doing so,
he distinguishes the scientific nature of law—that is, of Recht—from its “political
element,” by which he clearly recalls the classic conception of politics as expressed
in the Greek polis.46 While the political element of law originates in the event of a
multitude of people uniting around a common conviction and common vision of
the good, the technical element of law originates in the distinctiveness of the
scientific method. Whereas law, viewed from the perspective of its political
element, is nothing other than the common consciousness of the Volk, the
technical side of law is expressed in self-sufficient general rules.
Savigny’s hope, and his belief, is that the technical element active in scientific
law will remain connected to and inspired by the spirit of the Volk. The aim of
legal science is to develop an artificial and technical form for the positive
expression of law that is still shot through with life-inspired insight. Ideally, legal
science would marry the technical and political sides of law into a harmonious
whole. But realistically, the scientific approach is fraught with dangers. Its
philosophical and technical qualities could lead to a stale and formalist law of

44. “Indessen entsteht durch die dem Stoff gegeben wissenschaftliche Form, welche seine
inwohnende Einheit zu enthüllen und zu vollenden strebt, ein neues organisches Leben, welches
bildend auf den Stoff selbst zurück wirkt, so daß auch aus der Wissenschaft als solcher eine neue Art
der Rechtserzeugung unaufhaltsam hervorgeht.” Id. at 46–47.
45. Id. at 49 (emphasis in original).
46. Savigny, supra note 30, at 221 [12].
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abstract rules, where nuances of specific cases could be lost and individual human
concerns would be overridden by rational concepts. If legal science becomes too
powerful, it could, like positive law, forget and neglect the original source of law in
the Volksgeist.47
It is helpful to consider Savigny’s favorite example of insightful legal science.
The value of Roman law, he argues, lies not in the laws of Rome themselves, nor
even in the principles used by Roman jurists, but in the method through which the
Romans combined a mastery of legal principles with an unparalleled insight into
the historical life of the Roman Volk.48 Above all else, the Roman jurists excelled
at the melding of legal knowledge with insight into the historical unity of the
people. “What made Rome great,” Savigny writes, “[was the] active, living political
sense with which this people was always ready to rejuvenate its constitution in
such a way that the new served merely the development of the old.”49 The
Romans saw the potential pitfalls of legal science (“Omnis definitio in jure civili
periculosa est”) and that all efforts to define law and to set it into technical rules
risk the gravest danger—neglecting to represent the Volksgeist. Yet what
distinguished these jurists is that they saw the actual case and the living dispute
even when they thought and decided according to abstract principles. Blessed with
a vibrant and animated insight into the living spirit of Rome, they developed a
precise legal language so they could move “with unmistakable mastery . . . from
universal to particular and from particular to universal.”50 The Romans, in other
words, succeeded in developing an artificial science of law “without sacrificing
insightfulness and life.”51
In the spirit of Roman jurists, Savigny argues that legal science must connect
law’s technical side with its political and spiritual unity. Only insofar as scientific
law grounds its technical mastery in the depth of its political insight can law find
its origin outside the arbitrary will of a sovereign. The law, in other words, is to be
at once free and necessary.
For Savigny, as for Leibniz, the scientific approach to law is both a symptom
of law’s divorce from an original insight into justice and a proffered cure. Just as
Leibniz’s turn to science as a way of knowing law emerges from his sense that
insight can no longer provide a certain knowing of a rational law, so too does
Savigny embrace legal science only once law has ceased to be knowable through a
common insight into the culture and tradition of a people. Science, Savigny
imagines, is a cure for the loss of insight as the source of law.
47. “Ohnehin liegt in der einseitigen Beschäftigung mit einem gegebenen positiven Rechte die
Gefahr, von dem bloßen Buchstaben überwältigt zu werden . . . .” Id. at 227 [24].
48. Id. at 230–31 [29–31].
49. Id. at 231 [31–32].
50. “In jedem Grundsatz sehen sie zugleich einen Fall der Anwendung, in der Leichtigkeit,
womit sie so vom allgemeinen zum besondern und vom besondern zum allgemeinen übergehen, ist
ihre Meisterschaft unverkennbar.” Id. at 231 [30–31].
51. Id. at 231 [31] (“ohne die Anschaulichkeit und Lebendigkeit einzubüßen”).
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IV. JHERING
Savigny died in 1861. Upon hearing of the death of the man “in whom, as in
no other, the history of jurisprudence has been embodied since the beginning of
our century,” Rudolf von Jhering—one of Savigny’s greatest disciples—sat down
to write his obituary.52 As befits a man of science and ideas, Jhering moved quickly
from eulogy to engagement. He compared Savigny’s towering stature in
jurisprudence to Goethe’s in letters; then, after proclaiming that Savigny’s
unmatched brilliance would continue to shine brightly for centuries, Jhering
attacked the very core of Savigny’s historical legal science.
The heart of Savigny’s teaching, Jhering writes, is that “laws are not made, but
rather become, that they come forth like language and custom from the innermost
life and thinking of a nation unmediated by calculation and consciousness.”53 In
setting the essence of law in the invisible activity of history, Savigny, Jhering
insists, concedes too much to the past and underestimates “the worth and the
significance of human activity and human force.”54 To elevate history to the
highest source of law is to devalue “the role that free resolve, reflection, and
intention play in history” and in law.55 Savigny’s fatal error is that he imagines law
to “become” without the active participation of human force. Against Savigny,
Jhering advances his own thesis that the original essence of law is not an historical
becoming but a human act.
Jhering’s insistence that law is a product of human activity challenges
Savigny’s attempt to meld historical and technical legal science under the
ambiguous heading of historical insight. Just as Savigny denied the accessibility
and reality of Leibniz’s situating a truer source of law in divine reason, so now
does Jhering deride as a “flight from historical fact” Savigny’s faith in a truer
source of law in history.56 For Jhering, Savigny’s conviction that historical science
can uncover the invisible laws behind the creation of law partakes of the basic
natural law fantasy that the true scientist must expose. By invoking science,
Jhering makes clear that his criticism of Savigny’s thesis is anything but an
abandonment of the scientific approach to law. On the contrary, Jhering seeks to
replace Savigny’s “lazy” science with his own rigorous and courageous science that
stays true to the facts of life.57

52.

Rudolf von Jhering, Friedrich Karl Von Savigny, in 5 JAHRBÜCHER FÜR DIE DOGMATIK DES
PRIVATRECHTS 354, 355 (C.F. von Gerber & R. Jhering
eds., 1861).
53. Id. at 364–65 (“daß die Rechte nicht gemacht wären, sondern würden, daß sie hervorgingen,
wie Sprache und Sitte, aus dem Innersten des Volks-lebens und –Denkens, ohne das Medium der
Berechnung und des Bewußtseins”).
54. Id. at 368–69 (“den Werth und die Bedeutung der menschlichen Thatkraft, die Rolle, die
der freie Entschluß, die Reflexion und Absicht in der Geschichte spielen, ebenso unterschätzen”).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 369.
57. RUDOLPH VON JHERING, ENTWICKLUNGSGESCHICHTE DES RÖMISCHEN RECHTS 13
HEUTIGEN RÖMISCHEN UND DEUTSCHEN
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The science of law, Jhering argues, must come clean with the facts and admit
that law is a creation of man. That man makes law, however, does not mean that
Jhering endorses a brute positivism that subordinates law to arbitrary will. On the
contrary, Jhering curses simple nonscientific positivism as the “deadly enemy of
jurisprudence” against which jurisprudence must constantly defend itself.58
Beyond the mere facts of willful legislation, the science of law must see through
the apparent willfulness of human action and thereby raise positive laws to a
higher idea of law. Above the mere formality of judicial logic, Jhering continues to
believe, there is a scientifically knowable “substantial idea of justice and ethics”
that must be actualized in particular legal institutes and rules.59 He insists,
however, that the substance of justice is contained in humanly posited ends and
interests. Since law is first a product of human action, its higher second source
cannot exist outside of the world made by man; the “justice” of law is a creation
of man that follows the ultimate law of all social development: the law of ends.60
“The end”—as Jhering writes in the epigraph to his most famous book, The End in
Law (or, alternatively, Law as a Means to an End ) —“is the creator of the entirety of
law.”61 That law is essentially a means to an end, Jhering asserts, is the “motto”
governing his legal thought.
Jhering’s focus on ends is, on one level, reminiscent of the scientific drive to
justify law through jurisprudence that has its most forceful beginning in Leibniz’s
legal thinking. It should not be surprising, therefore, that Jhering names Leibniz as
a precursor to his own project and that the opening sentence of Der Zweck im Recht
announces Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason as the guiding idea of Jhering’s
legal thinking.62 For Jhering, as for Leibniz and Savigny, the principle of law is that
law must have a reason—what Jhering renames an “end.”
On another level, however, Jhering’s scientific grounding of law differs
fundamentally from the legal science that came before him. Whereas Savigny and
Leibniz imagine that law has its organizing principle in a transcendent unity that

(Leipzig, Breitkopf & Hartel und Duncker & Humblot 1894).
58. RUDOLF VON JHERING, IST DIE JURISPRUDENZ EINE WISSENSCHAFT? 55, 52–58 (Okko
Behrends ed., 1998).
59. See the footnote Jhering adds to his Geist des Römischen Rechts in 1883:
[U]ber dem bloß Formalen der juristischen Logik steht als Höheres die substantielle Idee
der Gerechtigkeit und Sittlichkeit, und eine Vertiefung in sie, d.h. wie sie in den einzelnen
Rechtsinstituten und Rechtssätzen zum Ausdruck und zur Verwirklichung gelangt, ist nach
menem Dafürhalten die schönste und erhabenste Aufgabe, welche die Wissenschaft sich
stellen kann. Mein Werk: ‘Der Zweck im Recht’ ist der Lösung dieser Aufgabe gewidmet.
RUDOLF VON JHERING, GEIST DES RÖMISCHEN RECHTS AUF DEN VERSCHIEDENEN STUFEN
SEINER ENTWICKLUNG 361 n.506a (Scientia Verlag 6th ed. 1993).
60. JHERING, supra note 58, at 90–92.
61. “Motto: Der Zweck ist der Schöpfer des ganzen Rechts.” 1 RUDOLF VON JHERING, DER
ZWECK IM RECHT, at iii (Leipzig, Breitkopf & Hartel 3d rev. ed. 1893).
62. The first sentence reads: “Nach der Lehre vom zureichenden Grunde geschiet nichts in
der Welt von selbst (causa sui), sondern alles, was geschiet, d.h. jede Veränderung in der Sinnenwelt ist
die Folge einer vorangegangenen andern, ohne die sie selber nicht eingetreten würde.” Id. at 3.
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connects the individual to a more-than-human whole, Jhering answers
emphatically: “NO! My friends, the truth does not lie outside of the world, she lies
in the world, and that is the great advance jurisprudence has made in our present
century.”63 Jhering gives up on the dream of a transcendent law. His innovation is
to argue that legal science, in the name of science, must abandon the search for an
unknowable ethical ground of justice. The attempt to justify law according to
ends, Jhering argues, is a political rather than a metaphysical project. The search
for ends is destined to lead not to a single rational or historical truth, but to the
conclusion that all ends in law are interested ends.64
That law must be justified by extralegal and scientifically knowable ends
means, for Jhering, that the science of law is divided into two fully separate yet
dependent sciences. On the one hand, the science of law is a technical and formal
science of legal rules. The technical science of law employs logical rules of analysis
and synthesis to secure the clearest and most objective interpretation of legal rules.
On the other hand, the science of law must address the science of extralegal ends;
it depends, therefore, upon the study of human ends undertaken by philosophers,
sociologists, anthropologists, economists, psychologists, and other social scientists.
Lawyers must be aware of these ends if law is to serve them well. The two
sciences of law relate in that the technical science of law serves the normative
science of ends. What the science of law (as opposed to the science of ends)
requires is, above all, a technical legal system that makes law serviceable to the
social, political, and economic ends of society. Law—the technical science of
law—becomes a means by which to administer the justified ends set by the
scientifically driven sciences of legislation.
Jhering’s subordination of a merely technical law to the social and political
ends or reasons of law is at once the culmination of Leibniz’s original insight that
positive law must be subordinated to reasons and the unintended betrayal of
Leibniz and Savigny’s dream that science might preserve the sacrosanct bond
between law and justice. By subordinating law to the ends of the various sociolegal
sciences, modern law replaces law’s traditional concern with justice with the
pursuit of diverse social and economic ends: efficiency sought by economics;
order sought by sociology; normativity sought by philosophy; and security sought
by politics. Once law comes to serve social, economic, and political ends, law—
and with it justice—becomes subservient to its diverse justifications. Law, thus,
becomes a means to whatever justified ends it must serve. Law’s need for
justifications, therefore, means that law loses its traditional connection with
justice.
63. JHERING, supra note 58, at 68.
64. Clearly, Jhering’s scientific overcoming of truth illustrates the “Wille zur Wahrheit” that
Nietzsche describes as the self-overcoming of the will to truth, which is the last stage in the unfolding
of nihilism. See 4 FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, Also sprach Zarathustra II, in SÄMTLICHE WERKE:
KRITISCHE STUDIENAUSGABE 103, 146–49 (Giorgio Colli & Mazzino Montinari eds., 1980).

Assembled_Issue_3 v5 (Do Not Delete)

628

2/22/2012 9:07 AM

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1:3

V. CONCLUSION
The rise of German legal science that seeks to justify law—from its origins
with Leibniz to its flowering with the legal-historical school of Savigny and Jhering
in nineteenth-century Germany—is the precursor of almost all of twenty- and
twenty-first-century Western legal thought. For John Austin, the claim that law is
positive law flows from a scientific utilitarianism, according to which the social
need for order demands that laws be clear, verifiable, and knowable. Later
positivists, like H.L.A. Hart, disagree, arguing that Austin’s command theory of
law may give rise to obedience, but not to obligation.65 Instead, Hart argues that
law must seek to justify its authority by appealing to the social fact of the law’s
legitimacy.66 Similarly, Jürgen Habermas argues that modern law draws its
“legitimacy from a legislative procedure based for its part on the principle of
popular sovereignty.”67 For Habermas, as for Hart, the justification of modern law
depends on legitimacy, whether that is found in “habits of obedience,” as Hart
holds, or majoritarian rule, pace Habermas. What all modern theories of law share
is the felt need to offer scientifically grounded justifications for laws that have lost
their natural and insightful authority.
That law is justified does not mean that law is just. The science of economics
can justify a factory paying for the right to pollute a neighbor’s stream as efficient
and therefore legal. The science of politics can justify torturing suspected terrorists
to protect the security of the nation. But justifications, unlike justice, are subject to
argument. When law ceases to be just and must instead be justified, then law, as
Friedrich Nietzsche writes, becomes nothing but a “negotiated settlement”
reached by those with the power to legislate. Within the field of negotiated
settlement, law has no limits, since “everything has its price; all can be paid for.”68
In a world of positive law, all laws can be justified if the expected benefit justifies
the cost. Unmoored from ethical limits, law becomes an unconditioned selfassertion of what Nietzsche terms “will to power.”69
The emergence of a new form of law—law as a product of scientific
reason—is both a symptom of and a purported cure for the crisis of authority that
Friedrich Nietzsche later called “the death of God.” Nietzsche traced the death of
God back to Socrates’s ambitious but futile attempt to save a decaying Greek
civilization by a new reliance on reason. However, just as Socratic reasoning
65. See HART, supra note 3, at 20, 79–88.
66. See id. at 97–107.
67. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS 83 (William Rehg trans., The MIT
Press 1996) (1992).
68. 5 FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, Zur Genealogie der Moral, in SÄMTLICHE WERKE: KRITISCHE
STUDIENAUSGABE 245, 306 (Giorgio Colli & Mazzino Montinari eds., 1980).
69. See Philippe Nonet, Time and Law, 8 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 311 (2007). For an exploration
of Nietzsche’s understanding of positive law, see Roger Berkowitz, Friedrich Nietzsche, The Laws of
Manu, and the Art of Legislation, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1131 (2003); Philippe Nonet, What is Positive
Law?, 100 YALE L.J. 667 (1990).
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proved to be another kind of sickness that invariably served to undermine further
the very belief in truth it was meant to support,70 so too have the social-scientific
offspring of Leibniz’s legal science ruthlessly refuted all grounds for legal
authority. No science of law—be it Leibniz’s rational jurisprudence, Savigny’s
historical science, Jhering’s social and economic sciences, Austin’s utilitarianism,
Hart’s sociological jurisprudence, or Habermas’s normative jurisprudence—has
succeeded in establishing itself as a true science of justice. For some, the failure of
science to refound law’s authority has led to the recognition that science itself is
interested, subjective, and suffused with political and metaphysical
presuppositions. For others, the failure of legal science is an embarrassment. Most
legal scholars, however, simply carry on as if the recourse to economic and
democratic grounds for law were as natural as it is necessary. We all, to some
degree, ignore the basic fact that the scientific cure for law has failed to restore
law’s once vibrant bond with justice.
That the scientific cure has failed does not diminish either its impact on law
or its importance to us today. Shorn of its traditional and religious foundations,
law remains dependent on science for the rational grounds of its authority—the
only grounds that modern man is willing to recognize. Law continues to seek its
justification in the ever-paling scientific notions of efficiency, objectivity, and
legitimacy; however, even these diminished goals are increasingly seen to be
partial, contestable, and even illegitimate. The hope that science might reinvigorate
law’s connection to justice has failed. Instead, science has transformed law into a
technical means for governments to pursue political, social, and economic ends.
The failure of science to bring about a rebirth of law, however, is neither the
end of history nor the end of law. As long as the legal ideal of justice is still heard,
albeit faintly—as long as we can still make sense of the idea of justice that
connects us with our friends and fellow citizens without the need for law and
contracts—there is the possibility that acts of justice will inspire, ennoble, and
enable some to heed the call. The call and those who can hear it are rare, and yet it
persists: when a pharmaceutical company foregoes legal rights and agrees to treat
its neighbors with the dignity due persons; when a doctor spends hours operating
to save a young child without thinking about whether she is insured; when a
teacher sits in his office for hours upon hours, week after week, guiding his
student along the painful, even excruciating, ascent from the cave into the light;
when a friend speaks honestly and plainly, lovingly showing you your error—in all
these instances both grand and delicate, we are witness to the actuality of the
thoughtful and ethical activity of justice.
All the more terrible, depressing, and humiliating must the everyday
subjection of law to a product of science strike those who have glimpsed the

70. 6 FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, Götzen-Dämmerung, in SÄMTLICHE WERKE: KRITISCHE
STUDIENAUSGABE 55, 72–73 (Giorgio Colli & Mazzino Montinari eds., 1980).
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beauty of law’s active presence in themselves and others. For those of us living
through the divorce of law from justice, the rules of law appear naked, stripped
bare of any claim to a higher good. We may praise law for its legitimacy, its
fairness, or its efficiency, but we do not love it for its justice.
Might it be, however, that consciousness of the divorce of law from justice
can open a path to redemption? To bring into question the transformation of law
into a product of science is a first essential step in any effort to preserve the ideal
of justice beyond law. Whether the science of law can give way to an art of
legislation that would summon the just, the true, and the beautiful—what Plato in
the Phaedrus calls “the most purely shining-forth”71—is the question of our age.

71. PLATO, Phaedrus, in EUTHYPHRO APOLOGY CRITO PHAEDO PHAEDRUS 405, 484–85 [250
D–E] (G.P. Gould ed., Harold North Fowler trans., 1914).

